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SAVING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Paul R. Gugliuzza*

INTRODUCTION
Is it time to abolish the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over
patent cases? In the thought-provoking speech at the center of this symposium,
Judge Diane Wood says yes.1 The Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, she
argues, provides too much legal uniformity, which harms the patent system.2 But
rather than eliminating the court altogether, Judge Wood proposes to save the
Federal Circuit by letting appellants in patent cases choose the forum, allowing
them to appeal either to the Federal Circuit or to the regional circuit
encompassing the district court.3
Judge Wood is in good company arguing that the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive jurisdiction should be eliminated. In their pioneering article,
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, Professors Craig Nard and John
Duffy proposed to replace the court’s exclusive jurisdiction with a model of
“polycentric decision making” under which two or three courts would hear
patent appeals, permitting inter-court dialogue and enhancing the possibility for
self-correction.4 Judge Wood’s colleague on the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard
Posner, also has recently said that he “[doesn’t] think the Federal Circuit has

*
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1
Hon. Diane P. Wood, Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive
Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2013).
2
Id. at 4–5.
3
Id. at 9–10.
4
Craig A. Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1664 (2007).
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been a success” and that he would “return patent appellate responsibility to the
regional circuits, where it was before 1982.”5
Abolishing the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction may well improve
patent law. The Federal Circuit’s patent doctrine has been criticized as “isolated
and sterile” and “disconnected from the technological communities affected by
patent law.”6 Exclusive jurisdiction may also make the court too responsive to
the desires of the patent bar.7 However, two premises underlie Judge Wood’s
claim that the legal uniformity provided by exclusive Federal Circuit jurisdiction
harms the patent system, and in this paper I seek to highlight—and question—
those premises.
The first premise is that the Federal Circuit actually provides legal
uniformity. Judge Wood suggests that, due to the Federal Circuit’s exclusive
jurisdiction, patent doctrine is insufficiently “percolated,” meaning that it lacks
mechanisms through which case law can be critiqued, reexamined, tested, and
corrected, and issues worthy of Supreme Court review can be flagged.8 Yet
percolating forces do exist in the patent system. For example, in the Federal
Circuit, dissents critiquing existing doctrine are frequent and often lead to en
banc proceedings reexamining and sometimes correcting the doctrine at issue. In
addition, the Supreme Court, federal district courts, Congress, the Solicitor
5
David Haas et al., An Interview with Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner: Part I,
LAW360 (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/485352/an-interview-with7th-circ-judge-richard-posner-part-1. For another critique of exclusive Federal Circuit
jurisdiction, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE : HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 230 (2008) (arguing that the
Federal Circuit’s “poor response to new technologies,” particularly in the fields of
software and biotechnology, “suggests that a single, centralized appeals court is not an
effective institutional arrangement”).
6
Nard & Duffy, supra note 4, at 1620–21.
7
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1791, 1854–56 (2013). See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR
AUDIENCES 97–99 (2006) (suggesting that judges who serve on specialized courts “are
likely to orient themselves toward the legal fields on which they concentrate and toward
the lawyers in those fields”).
8
Wood, supra note 1, at 4. For a summary of the perceived benefits of doctrinal
percolation, see Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the
Supreme Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 699 n.68
(1984) (“The percolation process has four principal benefits: (1) it encourages the courts
of appeals to examine and criticize each other’s decisions . . . ; (2) it often provides the
Supreme Court with a number of independent analyses of legal issues . . . ; (3) it permits
the courts of appeals to experiment with different legal rules, which can provide the
Supreme Court with concrete information about the consequences of various options; and
(4) it can allow the circuit courts to resolve conflicts by themselves, without Supreme
Court intervention.”). For a contrary view about the normative desirability of percolation,
see Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673,
689–91 (1990).
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General, and the Patent and Trademark Office, among others, all provide,
through various channels, diverse and influential perspectives that prevent patent
law from becoming stale.9
The second premise underlying Judge Wood’s argument is that a lack of
dialogue among the federal appellate courts causes problems in patent law.
Problematic Federal Circuit doctrine, however, should not be blamed solely on a
lack of dialogue among peer-level courts. For one, as I have just mentioned,
there are substitutes for that dialogue in the current institutional design.
Moreover, several Federal Circuit doctrines that have been overturned by the
Supreme Court or criticized by scholars and judges seem heavily influenced by
the charges Congress gave the Federal Circuit upon its creation: to provide
uniformity and expertise in patent matters and to strengthen patent rights.10 For
example, de novo appellate review of patent claim construction arguably
illustrates a court seeking, perhaps overzealously, to pursue uniformity and to
provide its expert input on the most important question in any patent case.
Thus, normative proposals about the structure of the Federal Circuit
should not focus entirely on introducing percolation; they should also consider
ways to reduce the influence of the policies for which the Federal Circuit was
created.11 Importantly, there may be ways to reduce that influence while also
saving the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases. For
example, the President could appoint to the court more individuals who have
some knowledge of patent law but also have experience in many other areas of
law. The jurisprudence of the first-ever former district judge appointed to the
Federal Circuit, Judge Kathleen O’Malley, suggests that judges with such wideranging experience might be inclined to oppose doctrines that blindly pursue
patent-specific policy objectives at the cost of broader goals, such as litigation
efficiency and maintaining the consistency of patent law with other areas of
federal law.

I. PERCOLATION IN PATENT LAW
Although patent law under the Federal Circuit is more uniform than if
patent cases were decided by twelve different regional circuits, there are forces
in the patent system that resemble the percolation Judge Wood hopes would
occur in a pluralistic regime.12 Judges at all levels of the federal judiciary, as
9

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Part III.
12
For recent commentary challenging the assumption that patent law under the
Federal Circuit is uniform, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and
Coherent Adjudication: The Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505, 519
(2013), and Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1161, 1165–71 (2010).
10
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well as organizations within the executive branch, “elaborat[e] . . . competing
viewpoints” on important questions of patent law; those competing viewpoints
“present the Supreme Court,” which is paying increased attention to patent
cases, “with a clearer picture of the [legal] landscape”; and courts—particularly
the Federal Circuit—make “[m]istakes” that have the potential to “teach
valuable lessons.”13
A theory in the law and economics literature posits that the common law
evolved toward an efficient set of rules because disputes involving inefficient
rules settled less often than disputes involving efficient rules.14 As a result,
inefficient rules would be overturned more frequently in litigation.15 Drawing on
that theory, one danger of having appellate patent jurisdiction centralized in the
Federal Circuit is that the prior-panel rule (under which three-judge appellate
panels are bound to follow precedential decisions of prior three-judge panels)
discourages litigants from challenging inefficient rules of patent law and makes
it more difficult for the court to overturn those rules. For example, Professors
Nard and Duffy quote Judge Randall Rader, who recently resigned as chief
judge of the Federal Circuit, as stating that the court has “retarded the pace of
common law development in some important ways.”16 They also quote Judge
Rader’s immediate predecessor as chief judge, Judge Paul Michel, as stating that
the court “keep[s] replicating . . . old results based on . . . old precedents”
because litigants simply “echo” what the court has written in prior opinions.17
Yet the prior-panel rule does not keep Federal Circuit doctrine set in
stone. In fact, exclusive appellate jurisdiction might hasten the evolution of
patent law as compared to a regime in which patent appeals were dispersed
among the regional circuits. The Federal Circuit decides over two hundred
patent cases per year on the merits and issues over one hundred precedential
patent opinions annually.18 In fact, Judge Rader, in the speech quoted by
Professors Nard and Duffy, compared the Federal Circuit’s large docket of
patent cases to the small dockets of copyright and trademark cases decided by
13

Wood, supra note 1, at 4–5.
See Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 61
(1977).
15
See id.
16
Nard & Duffy, supra note 4, at 1622 (quoting Judge Randall R. Rader, The United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The Promise and Perils of a Court of
Limited Jurisdiction, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001)).
17
Id. (quoting Judge Paul R. Michel, Keynote Presentation, Berkeley Center for Law
& Technology Conference on Patent System Reform (Mar. 1, 2002)).
18
See Jason Rantanen, Federal Circuit Dispositions, Part I, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 14,
2011),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/02/federal-circuit-dispostions-part-i.html
(providing data from 2010). Unfortunately, in 2011, the Federal Circuit stopped
compiling this useful caseload data. See Jason Rantanen, Federal Circuit Statistics—FY
2011, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/10/federalcircuit-statistics-fy-2011.html.
14
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each regional circuit and concluded that the Federal Circuit had in some ways
“dramatically accelerated the pace of common law development.”19
Examples of rapid reexamination and fluctuation in Federal Circuit patent
doctrine abound. In the past six years alone, the court has convened en banc to
reconsider fundamental questions including: the standard of review for claim
construction,20 the patent eligibility of business methods21 and computer
software,22 and the standard for inequitable conduct before the Patent and
Trademark Office,23 among many others.24
In fact, it might be that judges who specialize in a particular area of law,
such as the judges of the Federal Circuit, are better positioned to evolve that
area of law than generalist judges on multiple courts would be. Specialized
judges might be more attentive to important issues in the field and more likely to
notice an issue that is ripe for reconsideration. The Federal Circuit facilitates this
close attention by circulating all precedential opinions to the entire court for
review, comment, and potential sua sponte en banc action before issuance.25
Moreover, centralization of patent appeals in the Federal Circuit makes it easier
for amici to track and alert the judges to cases worthy of en banc review. A
study by Colleen Chien provides evidence of the important role amici play in
spurring the Federal Circuit to reexamine particular issues, reporting that the
court grants twelve percent of en banc petitions accompanied by amicus briefs,
compared to less than two percent of petitions without amicus briefing.26 Such
19

Rader, supra note 16, at 4 (emphasis added).
Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (en banc).
21
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
22
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc), aff’d, No. 13298, 2014 WL 2765283 (U.S. 2014).
23
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc).
24
See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (finality of judgments in patent cases for the purpose of appeal); Akamai Techs.,
Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (standard for
inducing patent infringement), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar
Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (standard for infringement by products
redesigned after a finding of infringement); Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (standard for patent misuse); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (whether the written description
requirement is an independent element of patentability); Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa,
Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (standard for infringing a design patent).
25
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING
PROCEDURE No. 10-5 (July 7, 2010).
26
Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us
About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 397, 424 (2011). Professor Chien also
reports that six percent of Federal Circuit petitions for rehearing en banc are accompanied
by amicus briefs. Id. at 426.
20
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close attention to one area of law by both judges and amici seems much less
likely to occur in the regional circuits.
In addition, many if not most of the Federal Circuit’s recent en banc
rehearings were presaged by panel dissents or concurrences, or dissents from the
denial of rehearing en banc in other cases raising the same issue.27 These
separate opinions provide a forum for the court’s judges to criticize their
colleagues’ decisions and to propose alternative analyses of relevant legal
issues—two of the key functions of “percolation” as envisioned by Judge
Wood.28 Several Federal Circuit judges, for example, expressed dissatisfaction
with de novo appellate review of claim construction before the court granted
rehearing on that issue in March 2013.29
Sometimes the court’s precedential case law itself provides percolation,
with different panels articulating different viewpoints. For instance, before the
court’s en banc decision in Philips v. AWH Corp.,30 different panels of the court
adopted different views about the best sources to use in determining the meaning
of patent claims. Many opinions gave primacy to the patent’s specification and

27

See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 685 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir.) (Prost, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1312 (Fed. Cir.) (Linn, J., dissenting), vacated, 374
Fed. App’x. 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., No. 2009-1374, slip op. at
15 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4, 2010) (Rader, J., dissenting), vacated, 376 F. App’x 21 (Fed. Cir.
2010); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir.) (Linn, J.,
concurring), vacated, 595 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Princo Corp. v. ITC, 563 F.3d
1301, 1321 (Fed. Cir.) (Bryson, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part),
vacated, 583 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 498 F.3d
1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir.) (Dyk, J., dissenting), vacated, 256 F. App’x 357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
28
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
29
See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1373
(O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1044 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting); see also Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N.
Am. Corp., 500 F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (granting petition for rehearing en banc).
30
415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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prosecution history, 31 but others emphasized dictionaries, encyclopedias, and
treatises as “particularly useful resources.”32
Congress, too, plays a role in percolating patent law. For example, in the
lead up to the America Invents Act of 2011,33 members of Congress proposed
bills to reform Federal Circuit law on issues including damages, venue, and
willful infringement (which can entitle a patent holder to treble damages).34
While Congress was weighing those proposals, the Federal Circuit in an en banc
decision changed its law on willful infringement35 and issued panel decisions
that increased appellate scrutiny of plaintiffs’ choice of venue36 and of damages
awards made by juries.37 After the Federal Circuit’s decisions, Congress
abandoned those reform proposals.38 Thus, as Jonas Anderson has observed,
Congress can stimulate the evolution of patent law by acting as a “catalyst,”
identifying problematic areas of Federal Circuit doctrine and encouraging the
court to make a change.39
Despite the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, the current system is
also capable of identifying for the Supreme Court the patent cases it should
review, another key benefit of “percolation” according to Judge Wood.40 En
banc decisions and opinions by Federal Circuit judges dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc provide useful signals to the Court, as do panel dissents,
31

See id. at 1319.
E.g., Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir.
2002). The court in Philips rejected the Texas Digital line of cases, reaffirming the
primacy of the specification in determining claim meaning. Philips, 415 F.3d at 1321. For
academic commentary documenting a “distinct split in methodological approach” among
Federal Circuit judges on the question of claim construction, see R. Polk Wagner & Lee
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1170 (2004), and R. Polk Wagner & Lee
Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s
Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW
123–50 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (updating the original study, with similar
results).
33
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
34
Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 1827–28.
35
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(overruling case law requiring a patent holder to seek the advice of counsel to avoid a
finding of willful infringement).
36
See, e.g., In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see
also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 381–90
(2012) (discussing several Federal Circuit venue decisions that followed TS Tech).
37
See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
38
Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 1827–28.
39
Jonas Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit,
63 AM. U. L. REV. 961, 966–67 (2014).
40
Wood, supra note 1, at 4–5.
32
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which are quite frequent on the Federal Circuit. An early study showed that
Federal Circuit judges dissented more often than judges in four out of five
regional circuits used as a control.41 A more recent study showed that the rate of
dissent has dramatically increased since 2005, with dissents being filed in
roughly 25% of precedential patent decisions and only about 60% of
precedential patent opinions achieving unanimity.42
In addition, the Solicitor General provides influential advice to the
Supreme Court about which patent cases warrant review. Professor Duffy has
shown that, from the 1994 Term through the 2007 Term, the Supreme Court
followed the Solicitor General’s recommendation to grant or deny certiorari in
seventeen of the nineteen patent cases (89.5%) in which the Court called for the
Solicitor General’s views.43 This trend has continued from the 2008 Term
though the 2012 Term (which concluded in June 2013), with the Court
following the Solicitor General’s recommendation in eight out of nine cases
(88.9%).44
Beyond assisting the Court with case selection, when the Solicitor
General recommends granting a petition in a patent case, the Solicitor General is
almost by definition disagreeing with the substance of the doctrine articulated by
the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court, for its part, seems inclined to give
substantial weight to the Solicitor General’s views on the merits, adopting those
views in the vast majority of recent patent cases in which the Solicitor General

41

Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by
Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 815–18 (2010).
Professor Cotropia found that dissents were filed in 3.51% of Federal Circuit decisions,
compared with dissent rates in the regional circuits that ranged from 1.14% to 4.56%. Id.
at 815. When limited to patent cases, the Federal Circuit’s dissent rate increased to
9.28%. Id. at 816.
42
Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Disuniformity 12–13 (Univ. of Iowa Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 13-42, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2351993.
Professors Rantanen and Petherbridge hypothesize several potential explanations for the
increase in dissents, including an influx of new judges on the Federal Circuit and an
increasing number of Supreme Court patent decisions that are capable of multiple
interpretations, enhance lower court discretion, or both. See id. at 18–32.
43
See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 531 (2010).
44
See infra Appendix. The Supreme Court is also aided in selecting patent issues for
review by amicus briefs filed at the certiorari stage. Professor Chien’s study found that,
from 2000 to 2009, the Court granted certiorari on forty-five percent of patent petitions
accompanied by amicus briefs, compared to two percent of patent petitions filed without
amicus briefs. Chien, supra note 26, at 424. Chien also reports that thirty-one percent of
patent petitions were accompanied by amicus briefs. Id.
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has challenged a rule adopted by the Federal Circuit.45 Thus, the Solicitor
General provides an influential competing perspective on matters of patent law.
Moreover, the Solicitor General does not act alone when formulating the
position of the United States. Rather, the Solicitor General mediates the views of
various federal agencies with relevant expertise, including not just the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO), but also the Department of Justice (particularly
the antitrust division), the Federal Trade Commission, and, in appropriate cases,
organizations such as the National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease
Control, and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.46 In
fact, on the issue of the patent eligibility of isolated DNA sequences, which was
recently before the Supreme Court in the Myriad case,47 divergent viewpoints
had actually emerged from within the executive branch. The PTO had long held
that isolated sequences of DNA were eligible for patenting,48 but the brief filed
by the Solicitor General urged the Court to hold that isolated but otherwise
unmodified DNA was not patent eligible.49
A Supreme Court reversal of the Federal Circuit, which occurs in about
seventy percent of the patent cases heard by the Court,50 also percolates patent
law.51 Not only does the Supreme Court’s decision itself revise the law, the
decision can trigger additional percolation in the lower courts, the PTO, and the
International Trade Commission (which has the power to prohibit importation of
products that infringe U.S. patents).52 Additional percolation is particularly

45

See Arti K. Rai, Competing with the “Patent Court,” 13 CHI.-KENT. J. INTELL.
PROP. 386, 390 (2014) (noting that, from 1996 through June 2013, “of the fourteen cases
in which the executive branch disagreed with the Federal Circuit, the executive branch’s
position prevailed in all but two”); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Book Review, IP Injury and the
Institutions of Patent Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 747, 766–67, 770 (citing cases and additional
sources).
46
See Arti K. Rai, Essay, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante
Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1240–41 (2012); see also Rai,
supra note 45, at 390.
47
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(Myriad).
48
See PTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001).
49
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107.
The Court ultimately sided with the Solicitor General. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117.
50
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WISC. L. REV. 11, 40–41.
51
For an extended treatment of the Supreme Court’s role in percolating patent
doctrine, see John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657
(2009).
52
On the powers of the Commission, see 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
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likely if the Court, as it has regularly done in recent patent cases, adopts a
flexible legal standard that will require case-by-case elaboration.53
The Supreme Court currently performs its percolating role frequently, as
patent law is now one of the most robust areas of the Court’s docket. The issues
the Court has considered or is currently considering, like the issues addressed by
the Federal Circuit en banc, involve fundamental matters of patent doctrine,
such as patentable subject matter (repeatedly),54 nonobviousness,55 claim
construction,56 and infringement,57 as well as important issues in patent
litigation, such as declaratory-judgment standing,58 the burden of proof for
infringement,59 and remedies for patent holders.60 Also, as this article was going
to press, the Court decided two cases implicating the high-profile issue of
“patent litigation abuse.”61 Specifically, the Court ruled that the Federal Circuit
made it too difficult for prevailing parties in patent litigation to recover their
attorneys’ fees62 and that the Federal Circuit applied a standard of appellate
review that did not sufficiently defer to district court decisions to award or deny
fees.63
Federal district courts also percolate patent law. Speaking off the bench,
several district judges have questioned the Federal Circuit’s standards of review
and proclivity for reversal, particularly with respect to claim construction
orders.64 Although one might think that, while on the bench, district judges
would mostly try to avoid appellate reversal, some judges have actually rebelled
53
On the Supreme Court’s tendency to push for greater flexibility in patent law and
the “legal uncertainty” that results, see Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal
Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1133–34 (2010).
54
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, No. 13-298, 2014 WL 2765283 (U.S. 2014);
Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
55
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
56
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014); Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 13-854 (U.S. 2014).
57
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002);
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
58
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
59
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014);
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
60
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
61
The issue of patent litigation abuse is so hot that the President mentioned it in this
year’s State of the Union address. See President Barack Obama, State of the Union
Address (Jan. 28, 2014) (calling on Congress to “pass a patent reform bill that allows our
businesses to stay focused on innovation, not costly, needless litigation”).
62
Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
63
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
64
See, e.g., The Honorable Kathleen M. O’Malley et. al., A Panel Discussion: Claim
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671
(2004).
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against Federal Circuit doctrines that they perceive as inconsistent with Supreme
Court case law.65
The Federal Circuit has actually facilitated district court percolation by
giving those courts leeway to experiment with procedure in patent cases. For
example, although the Federal Circuit (in a decision affirmed by the Supreme
Court) held that the critical question of claim construction must be decided by
the judge, not the jury,66 the Federal Circuit did not impose any requirements
about when or how that construction must take place. Accordingly, claim
construction can be (and has been) performed in various ways: at a separate
hearing, with summary judgment, during discovery, after discovery, and even at
or after trial in the course of formulating jury instructions.67 Although most
courts now conduct separate hearings during fact discovery and prior to expert
discovery, that practice emerged from district court experimentation, not from
Federal Circuit fiat.68
Moreover, district courts are experimenting with local procedural rules to
govern patent cases,69 an experiment that the Federal Circuit facilitates by
granting appellate deference to district courts’ interpretation and application of

65

See, e.g., Macronix Int’l Co. v. Spansion Inc., No. 3:13-cv-679, 2014 WL 934505,
at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2014) (refusing to follow Federal Circuit case law that
“exempted” patent infringement cases from the pleading standards adopted by the
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)); Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., 666 F.
Supp. 2d 749, 751–52 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (noting that the Supreme Court has made it
clear that “there is no ‘single, precise, all-embracing’ test for jurisdiction over federal
issues embedded in state-law claims” but objecting that “the Federal Circuit appears to
impose precisely such an all-embracing test, effectively aggregating ever greater swaths
of state-law claims into its jurisdictional sweep” (citations omitted)), vacated and
remanded, 631 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011). State judges, too, have sometimes criticized
or ignored Federal Circuit law. See, e.g., Minton v. Gunn 355 S.W.3d 634, 655 (Tex.
2011) (Guzman, J., dissenting) (“This Court should not be quick to follow Federal Circuit
case law that fails to follow the test set forth by the Supreme Court.”); see also
Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 1817 nn.133–34 (providing additional examples).
Opportunities for critique of the Federal Circuit by state judges and regional circuit
judges might increase now that the Supreme Court has rejected a line of Federal Circuit
cases that extended exclusive federal district court and Federal Circuit jurisdiction to
practically all cases raising issues of patent infringement, validity, or enforceability. See
Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
66
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
67
PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 5-4 to 5-5
(2d ed. 2012).
68
See id. at 5-5.
69
See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J.
449, 473–74 (2010).
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those local rules.70 The Patent Pilot Program created by Congress in 2011 will
introduce further heterogeneity in patent adjudication as some patent cases in
some districts will be heard by judges who have volunteered to hear extra patent
cases while others will not.71
That said, procedural heterogeneity at the district court level is not the
sort of direct experimentation with substantive patent doctrine that Judge Wood
laments is missing under the Federal Circuit. When the Federal Circuit adopts a
rule of law, that rule governs the entire country (and proceedings at the PTO), no
matter if a few Federal Circuit judges (and even some rebellious district judges)
disagree. The oft-praised “laboratories of experimentation,”72 in which judges
and policymakers can observe the empirical consequences of different legal
rules, do not emerge, to the possible detriment of patent policy. 73
But one should not overstate the experimentation that would be possible
within the federal system if multiple courts of appeals heard patent cases. For
one, even if different courts adopted different rules of patent law, the PTO
would, as a practical matter, be forced to choose a national rule to govern
proceedings before the agency. The national rules chosen by the PTO would be
highly influential because only two percent of patents (at most) are ever
litigated,74 so few patents would actually be adjudicated under the potentially
differing laws of the various circuits. The PTO’s role in articulating and
applying national legal standards for patent validity is already growing because
of new review procedures created by the America Invents Act,75 and the
agency’s views would become even more significant under a model in which
multiple courts were capable of disagreeing.
70

See Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 774 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674
(2011).
72
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
73
For an argument that empirical progress in patent policy depends on greater legal
diversity, see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2015)
(manuscript
at
13–16),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294774.
74
See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1501 (2001).
75
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a), (d), 125 Stat. 284, 299–311
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). See generally ROBERT P.
MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1046–52
(6th ed. 2013) (describing the PTO’s new post-grant review and inter partes review
procedures); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1977–78 (2013) (arguing that
“application of administrative law principles to the new and modified postgrant review
proceedings triggers Chevron deference for the PTO’s interpretation of ambiguous terms
of the Patent Act announced during these proceedings”).
71
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Alternatively, one might suggest that, even if multiple courts of appeals
heard appeals in patent litigation, the PTO should simply be bound by the
Federal Circuit’s case law. (Judge Wood’s proposal does not address the issue of
choice-of-law at the PTO.) This arrangement, too, would limit experimentation.
For example, suppose that the Ninth Circuit held that computer software was
patent eligible, but the Federal Circuit held that it was not. In that scenario, the
PTO would not issue software patents, so the circuit split would not create much
experimentation. Conversely, suppose that the Federal Circuit permitted
software patents but the Ninth Circuit did not. In that instance, it seems
inefficient for the PTO to permit applicants to obtain patents that will be
categorically invalidated in litigation in a particular circuit.
Furthermore, even if different rules of patent law could be successfully
operationalized in different circuits, the benefits of experimentation would still
be limited by the difficulty of measuring the impact of different legal rules in
different geographic areas. Patents are only one of many influences on
technological innovation. Moreover, because of permissive venue rules, patent
lawsuits can be filed practically anywhere in the United States, regardless of
where the underlying technology was developed.76 It would therefore seem
extremely difficult to determine that a particular circuit sees more technological
innovation because of a particular legal rule in force within that circuit.77
Finally, unless the pluralistic model of appellate jurisdiction randomly
assigned cases to different circuits, it would be improper to label the model a
true “experiment” because certain litigants would self-select into certain circuits.
Patent holders in particular would do everything possible to litigate their cases in
the circuit with the least rigorous standards for patent validity because, under
federal preclusion doctrine, an invalidity judgment in one case renders the patent
invalid everywhere and for all time.78 Professors Nard and Duffy’s polycentric
proposal provides for random assignment of appellate jurisdiction,79 but Judge

76

See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1453–55 (2010).
See Ouellette, supra note 73, at 11–13 (discussing the difficulty of attributing
different levels of innovation in different jurisdictions to those jurisdictions’ varied
innovation policies).
78
See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330–50
(1971). See generally Alex Kozinski & Daniel Mandell, It’s Blonder-Tongue All Over
Again, 13 CHI.-KENT. J. INTELL. PROP. 379 (2014).
79
Nard & Duffy, supra note 4, at 1668.
77
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Wood’s proposal invokes randomization only when both parties appeal and
cannot agree on a circuit.80
It might well be that the percolators I have identified, such as Federal
Circuit judges, Supreme Court justices, federal district judges, and members of
Congress, are not the ideal percolators of patent law. Most of the Federal
Circuit’s judges share relatively homogenous backgrounds in patent law or
international trade, perhaps limiting their sensitivity to broader concerns of
social policy.81 Supreme Court justices, although perhaps more attuned to
broader policy concerns, have been said to know little about patent law82 and
have sometimes resisted engaging the factual and policy complexities that patent
cases present.83 Opinions by district judges (like dissenting or concurring
opinions by Federal Circuit judges) have no precedential effect and therefore
have limited real-world impact. And allowing individual members of Congress
to catalyze changes in patent law by simply proposing legislation has the
80

Wood, supra note 1, at 9. For a general argument in favor of randomized case
allocation among courts with overlapping jurisdiction, see Ori Aronson, Forum by Coin
Flip: A Random Allocation Model for Jurisdictional Overlap, 45 SETON HALL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2426134,
which notes that randomization would “enable comparison, experimentation, and
learning between forums dealing with similar questions” and would “make[] it more
difficult for sophisticated parties to plan, prepare, and strategize in order to reach
sympathetic courts.”
81
Of the court’s eleven active judges, four had significant experience in patent law
before joining the bench (Judges Newman, Lourie, Moore, and Chen) and two had
significant experience in international trade law (Judges Reyna and Wallach). See Judges,
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/
(last visited Apr. 23, 2014). In addition, Judge O’Malley had substantial experience
hearing patent cases as a district judge and Judges Dyk and Taranto litigated patent cases
before their appointments. See id.; see also infra notes 156–60 and accompanying text
(discussing Judge Taranto’s practice background).
82
See Golden, supra note 51, at 688–90.
83
For example, in Myriad, Justice Scalia refused to join portions of the Court’s
opinion providing background facts on genetics and “some portions of the rest of the
opinion going into fine details of molecular biology,” noting, “I am unable to affirm those
details on my own knowledge or even my own belief.” 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Also, the five-justice
majority in Bilski v. Kappos applied several textualist canons of statutory construction,
including the canon that “words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning,” to conclude that a business method could be a patent
eligible “process” under § 101 of the Patent Act. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226, 3229 (2010).
Four other justices correctly noted that the majority’s textualism was “a deeply flawed
approach to a statute that relies on complex terms of art developed against a particular
historical background.” Id. at 3238 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in the judgment). For an argument that textualism is a tool for
avoiding complex policy issues, see RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 178–
219 (2013).
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potential to undermine law’s democratic legitimacy. Still, the current model
does provide opportunities for divergent viewpoints to emerge and for doctrine
to be reconsidered and changed over time. Despite the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive jurisdiction, patent law is percolated. The fundamental problem seems
to be that the current system simply leads to the wrong outcome too often.

II. POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Why do misguided doctrines of patent law emerge? Judge Wood suggests
that a lack of percolation is the cause.84 However, the policies the Federal Circuit
was created to pursue also seem to play a role. The Federal Circuit was created
primarily to generate uniformity in patent law, provide expertise in patent cases,
and, although not as widely acknowledged in the public discourse, expand the
scope and strength of patent protection.85 Those policy objectives have shaped
several important Federal Circuit decisions, particularly those in which the court
has arguably gotten the law wrong.86
Uniformity. The overriding publicly stated reason to create the Federal
Circuit was to provide uniformity in patent law.87 The court’s judges, speaking
and writing off the bench, have characterized uniformity as a critical “mission”

84

See Wood, supra note 1, at 4–5.
For a historical summary of the Federal Circuit’s creation, see Paul R. Gugliuzza,
Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1453–58 (2012).
86
The court’s emphasis on the policies justifying its creation would likely not
surprise scholars of institutional design, who have theorized that “[p]olicy-oriented
missions are more likely to develop in courts with a high level of specialization.”
LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 39 (2012).
87
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22–23 (1981) (noting that the “central purpose” of the
Federal Courts Improvement Act, which created the Federal Circuit, was “to reduce the
widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist in the
administration of patent law”); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s
Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (discussing “the court’s Congressional mandate to promote uniformity
and certainty in patent law”).
85
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or “charge” of the Federal Circuit.88 Even the Supreme Court has sometimes
mentioned uniformity as an important policy goal in the patent field, although
the Court’s statements on this issue are themselves not particularly uniform.89
On the bench, the judges of the Federal Circuit have relied on uniformity
concerns to justify several doctrines of procedure and jurisdiction that are
inconsistent with well-established federal law. For example, the standards of
review of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provide the ground rules for
88

E.g., Judge Richard Linn, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, The
Changing Landscape of Patent Law at the USPTO, the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, Address at PatCon 3: The Annual Patent Conference (Apr. 12, 2013), available
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8BgC6qXWqo (12:30) (stating that the Federal
Circuit’s “mission” was to “bring uniformity and regularity to the law of patents”); Judge
Pauline Newman, After Twenty-Five Years, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 12, 123 (2008) (noting that
the Federal Circuit’s “charge, the expectation and hope of its creators, was that uniform
national law, administered by judges who understand the law and its purposes, would
help to revitalize industrial innovation through a strengthened economic incentive”). See
generally George C. Beighley, Jr., The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Has It
Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
671, 699–705 (2011) (various Federal Circuit judges citing uniformity as a
“congressional expectation” of the Federal Circuit).
89
Compare Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996)
(“[W]e see the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an
independent reason to allocate all issues of [claim] construction to the court.”), and
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162–63 (1989) (holding
preempted a Florida statute that granted patent-like protection to boat hull designs that
were not patentable under federal law, noting that “nationwide uniformity in patent law
. . . [was] frustrated by the Florida scheme”), with Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 832 (2002) (rejecting the argument that “Congress’s
goal of promoting the uniformity of patent law” justified permitting patent law
counterclaims to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction (internal quotation marks
omitted)), and Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (rejecting the argument that “[t]he need for uniformity in the
construction of patent law” justified Congress’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity
from federal patent infringement suits).
In previous work, I have distinguished two different dimensions of uniformity: legal
uniformity, which “reflects the notion that the law governing patent rights should be
articulated and applied consistently throughout the entire country,” and adjudicative
uniformity, which “reflects the notions that the claims of a particular patent should be
construed similarly from one case to another and that courts should not reach inconsistent
validity findings regarding the same patent.” Gugliuzza, supra note 50, at 21. The
Supreme Court’s statement in Markman reflects notions of adjudicative uniformity, while
the statements in Bonito Boats, Holmes Group, and Florida Prepaid reflect notions of
legal uniformity. Although those distinctions are important in conducting a normative
assessment of how power over the patent system should be allocated between the state
and federal governments, see id. at 35–61, the distinctions are less important in this
paper’s descriptive account of Federal Circuit decisionmaking because the court itself
does not usually distinguish between the two different types of uniformity.
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judicial review of federal agency fact-finding,90 but in In re Zurko, the Federal
Circuit held that the APA did not apply when the court was reviewing factfinding by the PTO.91 Instead, the court applied the standard of review normally
applied by appellate courts reviewing fact-finding by trial judges.92 In adopting
this unusual rule, the Federal Circuit cited the aim of achieving “consistency” in
its “review of the patentability decisions of the agency and the district courts in
infringement litigation.”93 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the APA
applies to judicial review of the PTO, just like any other agency. 94
Also, the Federal Circuit had held, counter to the well-pleaded complaint
rule that applies to practically all federal lawsuits, that a patent law counterclaim
could cause a case to “arise under” patent law and therefore fall within the
Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction.95 In support of this holding, the court
emphasized “[t]he broad theme” of the Federal Courts Improvement Act,96
which created the Federal Circuit: “increasing nationwide uniformity in certain
fields of national law.”97 The court asserted that “[d]irecting appeals involving
compulsory counterclaims for patent infringement to the twelve regional circuits
could frustrate Congress’ desire to foster uniformity.”98 The Supreme Court
again overturned the Federal Circuit and brought patent law in line with other
areas of federal law, holding that a federal patent issue must appear in the
plaintiff’s complaint to create federal jurisdiction.99
Similarly, in support of its holding that federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over state law claims for legal malpractice against patent attorneys,
the Federal Circuit cited “‘the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity
that a federal forum offers.’”100 The Federal Circuit’s rule, however, was
inconsistent with recent Supreme Court case law, which made clear that for
federal jurisdiction to exist over a state law claim, there must be a dispute about
90

See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
92
See id.
93
Id. at 1458.
94
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999).
95
Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 736,
742 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
96
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
97
Aerojet, 895 F.2d at 744.
98
Id.
99
Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002). The
Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes Group was, in turn, abrogated by the America
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(a), 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)), which extended exclusive federal jurisdiction to cases in which
the only patent issue appears in a counterclaim.
100
Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504
F.3d 1262, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue
Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005)).
91
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the “validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.”101 According to the Court,
the “mere need to apply federal law,” as is the case in the vast majority of patent
malpractice cases, was not sufficient.102 Yet again, the Supreme Court
overturned the Federal Circuit’s rule.103
The policy of uniformity has also influenced the Federal Circuit’s
decision to review de novo district court claim construction, a doctrine that has
been widely criticized as inefficient because of the factual determinations claim
construction requires and the inherent indeterminacy of the language of patent
claims.104 In the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Technologies, Inc., the court emphasized that its “role in providing national
uniformity to the construction of a patent claim . . . would be impeded if [it]
were bound to give deference to a trial judge’s asserted factual determinations
incident to claim construction.”105 And the court’s recent decision reaffirming de
novo review was based largely on the rationale that “plenary review of claim
construction . . . provid[es] national uniformity, consistency, and finality to the
meaning and scope of patent claims.”106
At this point, it is worth pausing to identify a paradox in the Federal
Circuit’s treatment of the policy of uniformity. As I have shown, the court’s
judges have mentioned that policy in numerous opinions that have been
overturned by the Supreme Court, have been criticized by judges and scholars,
or both. Yet for all of the Federal Circuit’s expressed concern about uniformity,
the court’s judges still take the “percolating” actions I identified in the first part
of this paper: they convene en banc frequently, they regularly dissent, and,
recently, they have issued deeply divided decisions that have practically
required the Supreme Court to intervene to make a definitive statement of the

101
Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
102
Id.
103
Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013).
104
See Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 1833 n.220 (collecting commentary criticizing de
novo review).
105
138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
106
Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1277
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
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law.107 As Chief Justice Roberts observed during a recent oral argument in a
patent case: “the Federal Circuit was established to bring about uniformity in
patent law, but [the court’s judges] seem to have a great deal of disagreement
among themselves.”108
Why the inconsistency between the court’s words and its actions? Any
answer is inevitably speculative, but I will offer some tentative thoughts. First,
there is the elementary legal realist point that the stated policy of uniformity is
not the actual motivator for the court’s decisions. As I have noted in prior work,
many of the decisions that cite uniformity also expand the Federal Circuit’s
power over the patent system, which in turn arguably enhances the prestige of
the court and its esteem within the patent bar.109 Uniformity, then, might simply
be a justification for pursuing those underlying aims. Alternatively, the court’s
judges simply may not see the disconnect between the text of their opinions
praising uniformity and their actions undercutting it. In any case, the salient
point for present purposes is descriptive: the patent system currently has
percolation precisely because it does not have the uniformity that the Federal
Circuit often lauds.
As a concluding example of how uniformity concerns shape Federal
Circuit doctrine, consider the Federal Circuit opinions in Highmark Inc. v.
Allcare Management Systems, Inc., the case in which Chief Justice Roberts
made his quip about uniformity. Under the Federal Circuit case law in effect at
the time, a prevailing defendant in a patent case could recover attorneys’ fees
only if the plaintiff filed its lawsuit in “subjective bad faith” and the lawsuit was

107

See, for example, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir.)
(en banc), aff’d, No. 13-298, 2014 WL 2765283 (U.S. 2014), which presented a question
about the patent eligibility of a claimed invention in computer software. As to two of the
three categories of patent claims presented, the court divided five-to-five on whether the
claims satisfied the patentable subject matter requirement of § 101 of the Patent Act. Id.
As to the final category of claims, a majority of the court’s judges voted to affirm the
district court’s judgment of invalidity, but the court issued no majority opinion. Id.; see
also Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(seven-to-five decision denying rehearing en banc on an issue related to shifting
attorneys’ fees), vacated and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014); Akamai Techs., Inc. v.
Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (six-to-five decision
on induced infringement), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
108
Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys.,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (No. 12-1163).
109
Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 1798, 1858.
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“objectively baseless.”110 The content and application of the standard for
awarding attorneys’ fees is a significant issue because some commentators view
fee shifting as an effective tool to deter and punish “abusive” patent lawsuits.111
In Highmark, the issue was the appropriate standard of review for a district
court’s ruling on objective baselessness.112 The Federal Circuit panel applied a
de novo standard.113 In a concurrence issued with the denial of rehearing en
banc, Judge Dyk (author of the panel opinion) defended de novo review, stating
that it “assures uniformity in the treatment of patent litigation, insofar as
reasonableness is the governing issue.”114 Dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc, Judge Moore took a different view of how de novo review
would affect uniformity, stating: “When we convert factual issues, or mixed
questions of law and fact, into legal ones for our de novo review, we undermine
the uniformity and predictability goals this court was designed to advance.”115
These dueling statements highlight the importance of uniformity in judicial
decisionmaking on the most important legal issues facing the patent system
today. Accordingly, in searching for causes of problems in patent law, we
should consider not only a lack of percolation but also the influence of the
policies the Federal Circuit was created to pursue.
Expertise. Another prominent reason for the Federal Circuit’s creation
was that the court would provide “expertise in highly specialized and technical
areas,” such as patent law.116 The objective of providing expertise also shapes
Federal Circuit doctrine. For example, in Highmark, Judge Dyk defended de
novo review of objective baselessness because “[t]he Federal Circuit brings to
the table useful expertise.”117 “Our court,” he reasoned, “sees far more patent
110
Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2005). The power to award attorneys’ fees derives from 35 U.S.C. § 285, which provides
that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.” The Supreme Court recently overturned the two-element test of Brooks
Furniture in Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756
(2014) (holding that “an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with
respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the
governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case
was litigated”).
111
See Letter from Intellectual Property Law Professors to Members of the U.S.
Congress in Support of Patent Reform Litigation 3 (Nov. 25, 2013), available at
http://www.patentlyo.com/media/2014/02/professorsletterontrolls.pdf.
112
See Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1308–10
(Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
113
Id. at 1309.
114
Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
115
Id. at 1362 (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
116
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981).
117
Highmark, 701 F.3d at 1356 (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc).
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cases than any district court, and is well positioned to recognize those
‘exceptional’ cases in which a litigant could not, under the law, have had a
reasonable expectation of success.”118
Judge Dyk’s explicit appeal to expertise is somewhat unusual, as the
court’s opinions mention expertise less frequently than the policy of
uniformity. 119 My prior work has shown, however, that the Federal Circuit, as it
did by embracing de novo review in Highmark, has developed many legal
doctrines that exclude other institutions from shaping patent doctrine and
adjudicating the facts of patent cases.120 These doctrines bolster the Federal
Circuit’s position as the expert patent institution, to the exclusion of other
institutions that might bring useful expertise to bear on patent law and patent
disputes. For example, in the field of administrative law, the court has limited
both the fact-finding and lawmaking power of the PTO, an institution that
possesses substantial patent expertise.121 Also, the court has refused to give
Chevron or Skidmore deference to the decisions of the International Trade
Commission on patent validity, enforceability, or infringement,122 even though
the Commission’s administrative law judges are experienced patent
adjudicators.123 Finally, the Federal Circuit’s affinity for de novo appellate
review of district court rulings on matters such as claim construction, attorneys’
fees, and willful infringement124 displaces trial court authority to definitively
resolve both factual and legal issues in patent cases. The court’s searching
appellate review can be a poor use of judicial resources, particularly on fact-

118

Id.
Interestingly, other courts have mentioned the Federal Circuit’s expertise in patent
law to justify questionable Federal Circuit doctrines. See, e.g., Byrne v. Wood, Herron &
Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that other courts’ decisions following Federal Circuit
case law sometimes “reflect the deference other courts give to the Federal Circuit on
patent law issues based on our unique appellate jurisdiction” but that “in many instances,
[the decisions] . . . us[e] our experience in patent matters as a facile way to explain away
circuit case law that is inconsistent with applicable, governing standards”).
120
See Gugliuzza, supra note 7.
121
See id. at 1820–23.
122
Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1568
n.112 (2011).
123
David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1702–03 (2009).
124
Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006–07
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
119
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driven questions.125 More to the point, the Federal Circuit’s exclusion of other
institutions from influencing the patent system is consistent with a judicial
objective to offer the court’s expertise on as many matters of patent law as is
possible.
Expanding and Strengthening Patent Protection. Many of the Federal
Circuit’s supporters also hoped that the court would expand the scope of patent
protection and strengthen patent rights.126 In the Federal Circuit’s very first
decision, the court embraced a relatively lenient standard of patentability by
adopting the precedent of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA),
rather than starting anew with both CCPA and regional circuit decisions
providing persuasive authority.127 Several analyses have concluded that courts
invalidate patents less frequently now than before Congress created the Federal
Circuit.128 Indeed, the judges of the Federal Circuit have boasted that their court
has “strengthened the patent system”129 and have warned against allowing
changes in the court’s personnel and in patent doctrine to “undermine or weaken
the patent system.”130
125
See Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1319–20
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting in part) (“The fact that we have been vested with
exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases does not . . . grant us license to invade the
fact-finding province of the trial courts. As a result of [our] appellate overreaching,
litigation before the district court has become a mere dress rehearsal for the command
performance here. Encouraging relitigation of factual disputes on appeal . . . vitiates the
critically important fact-finding role of the district courts.”) (citations omitted), vacated
and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
126
See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT 10 (2004).
127
South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc); see
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843,
869 (2010) (noting that, after South Corp., any regional circuit precedents that conflicted
with CCPA precedents were “discarded without ceremony or consideration”); see also
BAUM, supra note 86, at 183 (noting that the choice to adopt CCPA case law “favored a
lenient standard of patentability”). Before the Federal Circuit was created, the CCPA had
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from proceedings at the PTO. Appeals in patent
litigation before the district courts were heard by the regional circuits.
128
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 348 (2003); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley,
Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 251 (1998);
Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s
Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 114 (2006); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 1, 15–16 (2004).
129
E.g., Beighley, supra note 88, at 729 (quoting Judge Rader).
130
Linn, supra note 88, at 37:00.
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Several of the Federal Circuit’s most significant doctrines are consistent
with an objective to broaden and strengthen patent rights. For example, under a
long line of Federal Circuit decisions, a party asserting that a claimed invention
was obvious based on a combination of existing technology had to identify a
specific “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to combine those prior art
references.131 This so-called TSM test placed an onerous burden on a party
challenging validity, and, in 2007, the Supreme Court abrogated the Federal
Circuit’s test, adopting a more flexible standard, which acknowledges that
market demands and common sense might also make a claimed invention
obvious.132 In addition, the Federal Circuit had embraced a broad conception of
the types of inventions eligible for patenting under § 101 of the Patent Act,
including business methods and human gene sequences. The Supreme Court,
however, appears to view the Federal Circuit’s patent-eligibility criteria as too
broad, reversing recent decisions that held isolated human DNA and certain
methods of medical diagnosis to be patent eligible.133
The Federal Circuit has not only embraced doctrines that would make it
easier to uphold the validity of a patent, the court has also issued decisions
tilting the litigation process in favor of patent holders in important ways. For
example, the court adopted a presumption that a patent holder who established
infringement was entitled to an injunction against future infringement.134 The
Supreme Court rejected that presumption, holding that the usual equitable test
for an injunction applies in patent cases.135 Also, the Federal Circuit had
disincentivized patent licensees from filing declaratory judgment suits
challenging the patent’s validity, requiring that licensees first breach the license
agreement, exposing themselves to claims for damages.136 Again the Supreme
Court overturned that rule, holding that a licensee in good standing could file
suit if, generally speaking, there was a realistic threat of suit if the licensee did
not pay royalties.137
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the Federal Circuit invariably
acts to strengthen patent rights. Empirical evidence suggests that although the
131

See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–19 (2007).
133
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111
(2013) (isolated DNA); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1298 (2012) (method for determining safety and efficacy of drug dosage levels).
134
See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
135
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006).
136
Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
137
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). More recently, the
Supreme Court overturned a Federal Circuit decision that placed the burden of proving
non-infringement on the potential infringer who had filed a declaratory judgment action.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 846 (2014). The
Court instead held that the burden should be on the patent holder, just as it would be in a
coercive suit for infringement. Id.
132
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Federal Circuit has made it easier to uphold validity as compared to the regional
circuits before it, it has not made it easier for patent holders to prove
infringement.138 Indeed, Kimberly Moore has shown that most Federal Circuit
decisions on the often-dispositive issue of claim construction favor the accused
infringer, not the patent holder.139 Moreover, the Federal Circuit has begun to
heavily scrutinize large jury verdicts in favor of patent holders.140
Thus, rather than characterizing the court as single-mindedly “propatent,” one might rely on the court’s tendencies on validity and infringement to
tell a more nuanced story about capture. High rates of patent validity, combined
with infringement outcomes that unduly favor neither patent holders nor accused
infringers, are arguably the outcomes that patent lawyers would most prefer:
such a regime would, in general, encourage companies to actively obtain patents
(because they will mostly be ruled valid) and encourage both plaintiffs and
defendants to vigorously litigate infringement disputes (because both parties will
have a reasonable chance of prevailing). Indeed, recent evidence suggests that
the increase in the rate of patent validity shortly after the Federal Circuit was
created coincided with a surge in patenting and patent litigation.141 Moreover,
although the rate of patent infringement dropped beginning in 1990, the amount
of patent litigation has continued to grow.142 Thus, rather than simply

138

See Henry & Turner, supra note 128, at 114.
Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 241 (2005) (reporting that, from 1996
through 2003, Federal Circuit claim constructions, which the court conducts de novo,
favored the accused infringer fifty-eight percent of the time). Of course, there may be
some selection effects in that losing patent holders are particularly likely to press weak
appeals due to the preclusive effects of an adverse judgment. See supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
140
See J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1085 (2014)
(describing the Federal Circuit’s “shift towards a more aggressive supervisory role in
damages jurisprudence”).
141
See Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, Across Five Eras: Patent Enforcement in
the United States 1929-2006 23 (June 4, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2274383.
142
Id.
139
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characterizing the Federal Circuit as “pro-patent,” it might be more accurate to
characterize the court as “pro-patent lawyer.”143

III. SAVING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Modern patent law has its problems. The Federal Circuit may have
pushed doctrine too far in favor of patent holders and may be too solicitous of
the patent bar. By excluding other institutions from shaping patent law, the court
maintains its “expert” status but weakens other institutions, such as the PTO and
the International Trade Commission, which could beneficially shape patent law.
And, in the service of uniformity, the Federal Circuit has adopted procedural and
jurisdictional rules at odds with long-standing Supreme Court doctrine. Judge
Wood diagnoses patent law’s problems as stemming from insufficient
percolation; I have suggested that the policy objectives that animated the
creation of the Federal Circuit also play a role. Can institutional reform help
mitigate the distorting effect of those policies?
Perhaps. In the most extreme reform possibility (which Judge Wood does
not endorse), patent appeals would be heard only by the twelve regional
circuits.144 In that regime, one might still see references to uniformity in
appellate patent decisions, as uniformity is thought to be beneficial in most areas
of the law.145 But there would be no national policy of providing substantive
appellate expertise, and any inclination to strengthen patent rights would also
likely disappear.146
It is less clear how proposals such as Judge Wood’s, which save the
Federal Circuit but abolish its exclusive jurisdiction, would impact the weight
given by courts to objectives such as uniformity and expertise. On one hand,
appeals in patent litigation would no longer be centralized in an expert court
capable of providing uniformity, which would likely reduce the salience of
arguments that appeal to the policies of uniformity and expertise. On the other
143

For an interesting analysis of how the labor market for patent professionals is
shaped by the increasing number of patents and patent lawsuits, see John M. Golden,
Proliferating Patents and Patent Law’s “Cost Disease,” 51 HOUS. L. REV. 455, 476–89
(2013), which observes that “as the numbers of patent applications, patents and resultant
clearance questions, licensing negotiations, or lawsuits increase, the system’s demands on
a relatively scarce supply of people with appropriate scientific, technological, or legal
backgrounds increase,” “impos[ing] a sort of ‘diversion of labor’ cost on the economy,
pulling skilled labor away from economic sectors with greater opportunities for growth in
productivity.”
144
For a proposal along these lines, see Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Rethinking Federal
Circuit Jurisdiction—A Short Comment, 100 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 23, 24 (2012).
145
For a challenge to this conventional view, see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing
Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008).
146
In fact, the court’s abolition might be interpreted by the regional circuits as a
message to weaken patents, a policy that in the long run could cause its own problems.
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hand, the salience of those arguments would not be completely eliminated
because the expert Federal Circuit would continue to exist. Indeed, Judge Wood
herself contemplates that, under her proposal, “the Federal Circuit would still
play a leading role in shaping patent law.”147 Other appellate courts hearing
patent cases might then simply defer to Federal Circuit law, which has already
been (and might continue to be) distorted by considerations of uniformity and
expertise.148 Further, if the Federal Circuit were to continue to have exclusive
jurisdiction over PTO appeals (Judge Wood does not address this issue in her
speech), other appellate courts deciding patent cases might interpret that
structure as continued evidence of a national policy of patent law uniformity.
Thus, to ensure that Judge Wood’s proposal actually introduces heterogeneity
into patent law, the proposal would have to clearly instruct the regional circuits
not to defer to Federal Circuit precedent.149
But there may be ways to reduce the pull of the Federal Circuit’s policy
objectives that are both less drastic than abolishing the court’s exclusive
jurisdiction and more realistic because they require no action by Congress.150 For
example, the President might seek to appoint judges who have some experience
in patent law but who also have a range of experience in other areas. This

147

Wood, supra note 1, at 10.
It is already somewhat commonplace for courts—even peer-level federal appellate
courts—to defer to the Federal Circuit on matters related to patent law. See, e.g., USPPS,
Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 281–82 (5th Cir. 2011) (following Federal
Circuit jurisdictional law that was in tension with a prior decision of the Fifth Circuit,
noting that “[o]ur decision is guided by . . . the strong federal interest in the removal [of]
non-uniformity in the patent law” (second alteration in original, internal quotation marks
omitted)); Schinzing v. Mid-States Stainless, Inc., 415 F.3d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“adopt[ing] the Federal Circuit’s precedent on substantive issues of patent law”); see
also Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting “the deference other
courts give to the Federal Circuit on patent law issues based on our unique appellate
jurisdiction”). Remarkably, in a recent Supreme Court argument, Chief Justice Roberts
asked whether the Supreme Court might “give some deference to” a decision of the
Federal Circuit, given that the court “was set up to develop patent law in a uniform way.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184).
149
Rochelle Dreyfuss, in her contribution to this symposium, makes a similar point,
noting that for Judge Wood’s proposal “[t]o improve [the] quality [of patent law], the
regional circuits would have to refrain from following Federal Circuit precedent in cases
of national importance.” Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Abolishing Exclusive Jurisdiction in the
Federal Circuit: A Response to Judge Wood, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 327, 344
(2014).
150
On whether Judge Wood’s proposal to abolish the Federal Circuit’s exclusive
jurisdiction is politically feasible, see Rai, supra note 45, at 387, which notes that
“[c]onsiderations of political economy are not on Judge Wood’s side.”
148
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broader experience might make those judges hesitant to rely on patent-specific
policy objectives to justify a decision in tension with broader legal principles.
There is evidence that a generalist judge with significant knowledge of
patent law can be a good steward of the patent system. The most “generalist”
judge currently on the Federal Circuit is Judge Kathleen O’Malley, who was
appointed in 2010 after sixteen years as a district judge in the Northern District
of Ohio. Judge O’Malley was the first-ever district judge appointed to the
Federal Circuit, and in her short time on the bench, she has taken strong
positions against some of the Federal Circuit doctrines I have identified as
connected to the court’s foundational policy objectives. For example, she wrote
several opinions questioning the Federal Circuit’s expansive approach to
exclusive federal jurisdiction over state-law claims,151 and her position was
vindicated by the Supreme Court in Gunn v. Minton.152 She also wrote an
opinion arguing that the Federal Circuit should revisit its rule that claim
construction is reviewed de novo on appeal,153 as well as the dissent in the recent
en banc case in which the court reaffirmed the de novo standard.154 Judge
O’Malley’s position might again be vindicated, as the Supreme Court has
recently agreed to decide the appropriate standard of review for claim
construction.155
Judge Richard Taranto, another recent appointee, may also turn out to be
a commendable example of a generalist judge with significant knowledge of
patent law. Judge Taranto’s law practice focused on appellate litigation, and,
although he argued several significant patent cases before the Supreme Court156
and the Federal Circuit,157 he also argued Supreme Court cases on issues of
151

See Minkin v. Gibbons, P.C., 680 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J.,
concurring); Memorylink Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 676 F.3d 1051, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Landmark Screens, LLC v.
Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius, LLP, 676 F.3d 1354, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley,
J., concurring); USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 676 F.3d 1341, 1350 (O’Malley,
J., concurring), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 1794 (2013); Byrne, 676 F.3d at 1027
(O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Byrne v. Wood, Herron &
Evans, LLP, 450 F. App’x 956, 960–61 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (authoring majority opinion that
followed but questioned Federal Circuit precedent), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct.
1454 (2013).
152
133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
153
Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
154
Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1296
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
155
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 13-854 (U.S. 2014).
156
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
157
E.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 238 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

No. 2]

Saving the Federal Circuit

377

antitrust law,158 copyright law,159 and trade dress law,160 and he spent three years
in the Office of the Solicitor General. Thus, Judge Taranto might also be poised
to temper the influences of the Federal Circuit’s foundational policy objectives
on the court’s case law.

CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of Judge Wood’s speech is her
evident enthusiasm for hearing patent cases.161 She makes clear that, contrary to
the conventional wisdom, some judges relish the challenge of a patent dispute.
Yet many regional circuit judges will never hear a patent case.162 Thirty years
ago, when patent law was viewed as a specialized, esoteric area of law,
removing patent appeals from the judicial mainstream might not have been a
major concern for public policy. But patent law is far more visible and important
today, and it is unfortunate that some of our most accomplished federal judges,
such as Judge Wood, have practically no say in the development of patent
doctrine. That may, in fact, be the best reason for abolishing the Federal
Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals.

158
Verizon Communc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004).
159
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
160
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
161
See Wood, supra note 1, at 10 (“Speaking personally, I would welcome the reintegration of intellectual property law in the regional circuits.”).
162
A few regional circuit judges have recently presided over patent cases at the trial
level. See, e.g., Vederi, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-07747, 2012 WL 4511424
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2012) (Kozinski, C.J., sitting by designation), vacated and
remanded, 744 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d
901 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Posner, J., sitting by designation), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
vacated in part, and remanded, Nos. 2012-1548, 2012-1549, 2014 WL 1646435 (Fed.
Cir. Apr. 25, 2014). Regional circuit judges have also occasionally sat by designation on
the Federal Circuit, but that last occurred in 2009. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL
CIRCUIT
VISITING
JUDGES,
available
at
http://cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/judicial-reports/vjchartforwebsite2006-2013.pdf
(last visited July 8, 2014).

APPENDIX
Patent Cases Involving Supreme Court Orders Calling for the Views of the
Solicitor General Issued in October Terms 2008 through 2013*

Case

Term Order
SG Cert.
Issued
Recommendation

Cert.
Decision

Bd. of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche
Molecular Sys., Inc.

2009

Grant

Granted

Applera Corp. v. Enzo Biochem,
Inc.

2010

Deny

Denied

Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v.
Novo Nordisk A/S

2010

Grant

Granted

Saint-Gobain Ceramics &
Plastics, Inc. v. Siemens Med.
Solutions USA, Inc,

2011

Deny

Denied

Bowman v. Monsanto Co.

2011

Deny

Granted

GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc.

2011

Deny

Denied

Retractable Techs., Inc. v.
Becton, Dickinson & Co.

2011

Deny

Denied

Sony Computer Entm’t Am.
LLC v. 1st Media, LLC

2012

Deny

Denied

Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc.

2012

Grant

Granted

Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v.
Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling

2013

Not filed

Dismissed
Due to
Settlement

Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco
Sys., Inc.

2013

Not yet filed
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